The contribution of corporate ventures to radical innovation by Czarnitzki, Dirk et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-060
The Contribution of Corporate Ventures 
to Radical Innovation
Dirk Czarnitzki, Johannes M.H. Dick, 
and Katrin Hussinger
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-060
The Contribution of Corporate Ventures 
to Radical Innovation
Dirk Czarnitzki, Johannes M.H. Dick, 
and Katrin Hussinger
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10060.pdf
 Non-Technical Summary 
Established firms’ difficulty to innovate has been discussed extensively among 
economists. In contrast to incumbent firms, industry entrants are often described to be 
more flexible and innovative, setting forth the process of creative destruction. A recent 
stream in the management literature argues, however, that incumbent firms can take 
measures to overcome their presumed lack of innovativeness. In particular, corporate 
venturing is discussed as an effective tool for fostering the incumbent firms’ radical 
innovativeness. By setting up corporate ventures (CVs), incumbent firms create 
autonomous or semi-autonomous units, which are less constrained by “inertial forces”. As 
a result, CVs can react faster and more flexible to emerging innovation opportunities 
while being supported by the financial resources of their parent firms. In practice, 
however, established firms can be tempted to exert too much control on their ventures. If 
the venture’s freedom to operate is restricted, however, their expected radical 
innovativeness can fail to appear. This study investigates the contribution of corporate 
ventures to radical innovation empirically. 
Our analysis is based on a sample of about 2,500 ventures in German 
manufacturing in the period 1993-2007. We find that CVs innovate more radically than a 
control group of independent ventures (IVs). The contribution of corporate ventures to 
radical innovations, however, significantly decreases with a more concentrated ownership 
structure. Ownership concentration increases the parents’ incentive to monitor and control 
the ventures. The resulting lack of managerial discretion makes it difficult for the 
ventures to develop radical innovations. In conclusion, our findings signal the need to 
balance the control incentive, stemming from the incumbents’ investment into corporate 
 venturing, with the benefits from granting some independence to the ventures. We 
conclude with management advice on how a balance can be achieved. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze  
Die Schwierigkeit etablierter Firmen, zu innovieren, wird in der Literatur 
kontrovers diskutiert. Basierend auf ihren bürokratischen und hierarchischen Strukturen 
wird etablierten, großen Unternehmen eine gewisse Trägheit bezüglich innovativer 
Aktivitäten nachgesagt. Im Gegensatz dazu sind Marktneueinsteiger flexibler und 
innovativer, was einen Prozess „kreativer Zerstörung“ in Gang setzt. Ein Zweig der 
betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur argumentiert jedoch, dass auch etablierte Unternehmen 
bestimmte Maßnahmen treffen können, um ihre Innovationstätigkeit zu steigern. 
Insbesondere werden Unternehmensausgründungen („Corporate Venturing“) als eine 
solche Maßnahme beschrieben. Diese Strategie empfiehlt, dass gegenwärtige Marktführer 
unabhängige Geschäftseinheiten formieren, die nicht der innovationsbezogenen Trägheit 
des Großunternehmens unterliegen. Infolgedessen können solche Ausgründungen 
schneller und flexibler auf Innovationsmöglichkeiten reagieren. 
Unternehmensausgründungen profitieren zusätzlich zu ihrer operativen Unabhängigkeit 
von den Ressourcen der Mutterunternehmen. In der Praxis kommt es jedoch oft vor, dass 
die Mutterunternehmen zu viel Kontrolle auf Tochterunternehmen ausüben. Dies kann 
dazu führen, dass die vermeintlich unabhängigen externen Unternehmenseinheiten in 
ihrer Innovationstätigkeit stark eingeschränkt sind und daher keine radikalen 
Innovationen hervorbringen. In dieser Studie untersuchen wir empirisch, welcher der 
beiden Effekte überwiegt: der positive Effekt auf die Innovationstätigkeit der externen 
Unternehmung durch den verbesserten Zugang zu Ressourcen oder der negative Effekt 
durch die ausgeübte Kontrolle durch das Mutterunternehmen.  
Unsere Datenbasis umfasst etwa 2.500 junge Unternehmen des verarbeitenden 
Gewerbes in Deutschland im Zeitraum von 1993-2007. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
 diejenigen Unternehmen, die von Gründung an Unterstützung durch ein großes, 
etabliertes erfahren, radikaler innovieren als eine Kontrollgruppe von unabhängigen 
Unternehmen. Die radikale Innovationstätigkeit der Ausgründung wird jedoch durch ein 
konzentriertes Eigentumsverhältnis vermindert, da etablierte Unternehmen dadurch einen 
Anreiz haben, zu viel Kontrolle auf die vermeintlich unabhängige 
Unternehmensausgründung auszuüben. Dadurch fehlen den Geschäftsführern der 
Ausgründung Freiräume, eigene Entscheidungen zu treffen, was unabhängiges Handeln 
und insbesondere radikales Innovieren erschwert. Großunternehmen, die Ausgründungen 
als Innovationsstrategie heranziehen, müssen den Anreiz, Kontrolle auszuüben, gegen 
den Vorteil der operativen Unabhängigkeit des ausgegründeten Unternehmens abwägen. 
Unsere Studie endet mit Vorschlägen, wie eine solche Balance erzielt werden kann.  
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1.  Introduction  
Since Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) put forward the importance of firm 
incumbency and market structure for innovation, the academic literature continued 
discussing these topics controversially. In the industrial organization literature, scholars 
emphasized the threat of entry as a feasible incentive for incumbents (monopolists) to 
invest in innovation (Lee and Wilde 1980, Reinganum 1983, 1984, 1985, Gilbert and 
Newbery 1982, Leininger 1994, Etro 2004). This argument is based on the notion that 
innovations can help incumbent firms to defend their leadership position against 
challengers. However, incumbent firms can also be reluctant to create breakthrough 
innovations since the returns from existing products could be cannibalized. Depending on 
the model assumptions, the results concerning the innovativeness of incumbents differ.2 
The management literature has also documented the difficulties of incumbent firms 
to stay up front in terms of adopting or developing new technologies within an industry 
(Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Sull 1999, Tushman and Anderson 1986). More specifically, it 
has been argued that industry entrants are better able to develop new technologies than 
incumbent firms, setting forth the process of creative destruction (Christensen and Bower 
1996). This strand of literature suggests that the innovation performance of established 
companies is typically found to decline while new entrants succeed at introducing 
radically new products to the market. Explanations for this phenomenon focus on the 
inability of incumbent firms to renew their capabilities so that an upcoming technology 
can be adopted and finally commercialized (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000).  
                                                 
2 Empirical studies on the innovativeness of incumbent firms in the field of industrial organization also 
come to different conclusions (Lerner 1997, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004a, 2010). 
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In contrast to the economics literature, however, management studies argue that 
incumbent firms can take measures to overcome their apparent disadvantage, if compared 
to industry entrants, at adopting or developing new technologies. Several management 
scholars claim that corporate entrepreneurship in general and corporate venturing in 
particular form valid strategies for established firms to pioneer innovations (Christensen 
1997, Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Vanhaverbeke and Peters 2005). Corporate venturing 
entails both the creation of new businesses within the incumbents’ organizational domain 
and the investment in external ventures at the time of their foundation (Sharma and 
Chrisman, 1999).3  
Such corporate ventures (CVs) have the advantage of being autonomous or semi-
autonomous from their corporate sponsor. This allows them to make their own strategic 
decisions without being constrained by “inertial forces” stemming from parent 
companies’ focus on existing technologies, rigid routines, and well-established value 
networks (Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Fast 1979, Biggadike 1979, von Hippel 1977, 
Sharma and Chrisman 1999, Burgelman 1983a). As a result, CVs are faster and more 
flexible in their response to emerging radical investment opportunities than industry 
incumbents (Thornhill and Amit 2001, Hill et al. 2009). The question remains however, 
to which degree CVs can actually operate independently. Ginsberg and Hay (1994) assert 
that incumbent parent companies will never grant full autonomy and flexibility to their 
ventures because they have to bear the financial risk in case the ventures fail. In a similar 
vein, Zahra (1996) argues that parent companies might show some signs of resistance 
towards the activities of their ventures, thereby denying them the autonomy that is 
required for developing innovations.  
                                                 
3 Prominent examples of incumbent firms that have been known for creating corporate ventures include 3M, 
General Electric, Hewlett Packard, DuPont, Unilever, Procter and Gamble, British Telecom or the Degussa 
AG, which is one of the world’s largest chemical companies (Block and MacMillan 1993, Miles and Covin 
2002, Maine 2008). See Narayan et al. (2009) for a recent survey on corporate venturing. 
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Based on the described ambiguity related to the usefulness of CVs for the 
innovation process, this paper presents an empirical investigation of the innovation 
performance of CVs as compared to a control group of independent ventures (IVs). If 
CVs are conducive to radical innovation, as theory predicts, we would expect that they 
innovate more radically than IVs. The reason for this is twofold. First of all, incumbent 
firms can be expected to engage in corporate venturing activities with an explicit focus on 
radical innovations. Secondly, CVs are better able to access financial and non-financial 
resources than IVs as they can rely on the support of their sponsoring firms. We further 
investigate the effect of controlling the venture and the implications for its innovativeness. 
If ownership is concentrated, the incumbent firm has a strong incentive to monitor the 
venture as - given the large amount of capital invested - the return from venturing is 
significant. A lack of operational independence, however, diminishes the venture’s 
ambition and freedom to engage in radical innovation projects. In case multiple owners 
decide to establish a venture, monitoring incentives are lower because the financial stakes 
invested by each party are small. Furthermore, a free-rider problem arises as every action 
taken by an individual shareholder to improve the venture’s performance, has to be 
agreed on by all shareholders. The venture’s freedom to operate is higher in this situation, 
increasing the chance of radical innovations.     
Based on a sample of about 2,500 ventures in German manufacturing, 
corresponding to almost 6,000 venture-year observations, we investigate the innovation 
performance of CVs and IVs. Our database allows a distinction between innovations that 
are new to the market and innovations that constitute an improvement to already existing 
products. The contribution of CVs to innovations that are new to the market, i.e. the more 
radical type of innovation, is particularly interesting since exploring new technological 
opportunities is one of the major reasons for corporate venturing. 
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Our results reveal that CVs in general are more innovative than IVs. However, the 
distinction between innovations that improve existing products and innovations that are 
new to the market shows that – as theory predicts – CVs are more effective at fostering 
radical innovation sales than they are at boosting incremental innovation sales. We 
employ instrumental variables regression to exclude reverse causality in the sense that 
inventors with a radical technology or idea might approach corporate investors for 
financial support in order to convert their idea into a marketable product. Moreover, our 
results show that a concentrated ownership structure diminishes the radical 
innovativeness of the venture. This suggests that corporate parents with a large ownership 
stake concede less autonomy to their ventures. We conclude that the success of CVs in 
terms of radical innovation depends on the corporate investor’s ability to strike the 
balance between resource provision and venture control. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on incumbent firms’ difficulty to innovate and outlines how corporate venturing 
can serve as a solution. Section three introduces our data and the fourth section describes 
the estimation results. Section five concludes and elaborates on management advice for 
corporate venturing.  
2. Corporate venturing and innovation 
2.1. The difficulty of incumbent firms to innovate 
Previous studies have proposed a variety of reasons why established firms have 
difficulties to develop radical innovations. Hill and Rothaermel (2003) summarize these 
arguments and classify them as being either of an economic, organizational or strategic 
nature. According to the economic explanation, incumbent firms with a powerful position 
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in the market will, under conditions of uncertainty about the research and development 
process, not invest as much in the production of radical innovations as industry entrants 
(e.g. Reinganum 1983). Such innovations can decrease customers’ demand for already 
existing products which explains the incumbents’ diminished incentive to develop them. 
Accordingly, established firms can be expected to introduce innovations that are 
incremental and as a result will not cannibalize the rent streams from already existing 
products (Reinganum 1983, Henderson 1993). 
Explanations from organization theory revolve around incumbent firms’ capabilities 
and the routines upon which they are determined (Winter 2003). Dougherty and Hardy 
(1996) argue that the organizational structure of incumbent firms tends to reinforce 
existing practices and routines. Over time, established firms have developed structured 
routines to efficiently process information that is coherent with their existing 
technological competencies (Tripsas 1997). These routines evolved around the 
competencies that led to the incumbent firms’ initial success, while restricting managers’ 
ability to search for information outside this predefined frame. Structured routines, 
however, appear to be most valuable in stable environments (Miller 1993, Ahuja and 
Lampert 2001). In case the organizational environment is shaken by the upcoming of a 
radically new technology, established firms are unable, unlike new entrants, to recognize 
the potential of this technology. Thus, incumbent firms may fail to respond appropriately 
to the arrival of a radical technology because of their structured and rigid routines. 
Furthermore, firms are heavily committed to their value networks comprising of 
customers, suppliers and investors. This commitment marks Hill and Rothaermel’s (2003) 
strategic explanation for incumbent firms’ inability to adopt and commercialize radical 
technologies. Resource allocation processes in large firms are oriented towards the needs 
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of powerful external parties like customers for instance (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 
Christensen and Bower 1996). As a result, incumbent firms will only introduce 
innovations that are demanded by existing customers in mainstream markets. However, 
when a radically new technology is “disruptive” in the sense that it aims at different 
customers in emerging markets, established firms will not allocate parts of their research 
budget to its development and exploitation (Christensen and Bower 1996, Christensen 
1997, Sull, Tedlow and Rosenbloom, 1997, Tripsas 1997).4 It can, thus, be said that the 
value networks of incumbent firms make them incapable to commercialize radical 
technologies that do not appeal to existing customers. 
Having understood the factors that hamper the incumbents’ innovativeness, another 
strand in the management literature emerged emphasizing means by which also large 
firms can develop and introduce breakthrough innovations (Rosenbloom 2000, Ahuja and 
Lampert 2001, Rothaermel 2001). In particular, it is argued that corporate venturing as a 
distinct form of corporate entrepreneurship (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994, Guth and 
Ginsberg 1994) can constitute a valid strategy for incumbent firms to overcome their 
obstacles to innovation and to develop radical products through new ventures (Day 1994, 
Christensen 1997, Stringer 2000, Vanhaverbeke and Peters 2005, Covin and Miles 2007, 
Maine 2008, Narayanan, Yang and Zahra, 2009). 
2.2. Corporate Ventures as a solution to a lack of innovativeness 
Corporate Venturing refers to the “entrepreneurial efforts” of incumbent firms 
which can involve the creation of new businesses or the investment in external start-up 
companies (Sharma and Chrisman 1999). The central argument in the management 
literature that explains why CVs are more successful at developing radical innovations 
                                                 
4 A radical technology can also be “competence destroying” in the sense that it renders the competencies of 
industry incumbents obsolete (Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
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than their parent companies centers on the operational independence of the ventures. In 
fact, CVs are described to be autonomous or semi-autonomous from the day to day 
business operations of their incumbent parent companies (e.g. von Hippel 1977, 
Burgelman 1983a, 1983b, 1985, Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan, 1988). This enables the 
ventures to make informed strategic and operating decisions (Fast 1979, Biggadike 1979, 
Zajac, Golden, Shortell, 1991) as they are faster and more flexible in their response to 
emerging radical investment opportunities (Hill et al. 2009). At the same time, however, 
CVs can benefit from their parents’ resources, which are an important requirement for 
enhancing the innovation process (Thompson 1965). CVs cannot only rely on the 
financial resources of their corporate sponsors but are also given access to non-financial 
resources like marketing capabilities, distribution networks or manufacturing facilities 
(Zahra and George 1999, Block and MacMillan 1993, Teece 1986). The ventures’ 
superior access to resources in combination with the parent companies’ explicit aim to 
create radical innovations when engaging in corporate venturing activities, leads us to the 
first hypothesis: 
H1: CVs are more successful in terms of radical innovations than a control 
group of IVs. 
However, the success of CVs in terms of radical innovations cannot be taken for 
granted. Although CVs are supposed to be autonomous entities (von Hippel 1977, 
Burgelman 1985, Kanter et al. 1990, Thornhill and Amit 2001, Siegel, Siegel and Mac 
Millan, 1988), some researchers claim that, in practice, CVs are often characterized by a 
rather tight relationship with their corporate parents (Zahra 1996, Stringer 2000). Without 
a sufficient degree of autonomy, however, CVs are affected by bureaucratic processes 
that can prevail within sponsoring companies. These processes usually entail complicated 
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and formal reporting requirements for all planned (innovation) projects (Kanter et al. 
1990, Thornhill and Amit 2001). As a result, the decision making process of CVs is 
slowed down and constrained by the parent companies’ control function. This in turn 
lowers the ventures’ effectiveness at developing and implementing radical innovation 
projects (Ginsberg and Hay 1994, Zahra 1996, Stringer 2000). Hence, a lack of 
independence could be one possible explanation for the absence of empirical support for 
H1. This explanation is confirmed by Zahra (1996) who concludes in his study on 112 
ventures in the biotechnology industry that IVs are more successful at developing radical 
innovations than CVs. Whereas CVs with a lack of independence have to inform their 
parents regarding promising radical innovation projects, IVs have simpler organizational 
structures, which allow them to make decisions more quickly and introduce radical 
innovations ahead of CVs (Zahra, 1996). 
In the next section we draw from the literature on ownership and control in order to 
have a closer look at the effect of venture independence on venture innovativeness. 
2.3. Exploring the effect of parent control on the ventures’ innovativeness 
The literature on ownership and control predicts that a high capital concentration 
makes the owners want to control the venture managers’ actions more severely in order to 
secure their investment by reducing agency problems (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997, 
Aghion and Tirole 1997, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2009). If venture managers lack discretion, 
they have fewer opportunities to spend the parents’ resources on private benefits (Gertner, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). With a dispersed ownership structure, in contrast, the 
venture managers have more autonomy and discretion for a variety of reasons (Burkart, 
Gromb and Panunzi, 1997). First of all, the more shareholders there are, the more difficult 
it is to agree on a common course of action to effectively monitor the ventures’ 
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management. Furthermore, all shareholders benefit equally if an individual shareholder is 
determined to control the work of the venture managers, giving rise to the well known 
free rider problem (Grossman and Hart 1980, Hart 2001). In consequence, shareholders 
underinvest in monitoring the CVs’ management. It can thus be said that “the 
management of a [venture] with many shareholders will be under little pressure to 
perform well” (Hart 2001, p. 1090).  
The comparison of different ownership structures alludes to the fact that ventures 
with a high capital concentration are more likely to be closely monitored so that their 
autonomy becomes significantly constrained. In particular, incumbent parent companies 
can make use of their control rights to monitor and supervise their ventures. Following 
Grossman and Hart (1986), the residual control rights enable the corporate sponsors to 
make the final decision regarding the use of the ventures’ assets. This implies that the 
incumbent parent companies can also decide whether certain radical innovation projects, 
as proposed by the ventures, are implemented or not (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1994). Having the decision rights (control rights) over the ventures’ innovation projects 
leads to two opposing results. At first, the control rights protect the incumbents from 
venture managers who are only interested in pursuing private benefits (Gertner, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1994, Hart 2001). But monitoring the ventures by having such a 
tight grip on the decision process for radical innovation projects can also diminish the 
innovative incentives of the venture managers. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) for 
example demonstrate that venture managers are unlikely to search for new investment 
projects (like a radical innovation project) if they are closely monitored by their corporate 
sponsors. The argument is that venture managers are unwilling to exercise the effort to 
come up with radically new innovation projects if they can always be overruled by the 
owners’ management. Similarly, Aghion and Tirole (1997) scrutinize that venture 
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managers’ incentive to acquire information for radical innovation projects is reduced if 
the parent company is likely to interfere. This suggests that ventures with a concentrated 
ownership structure are hindered to innovate radically because they lack the discretion to 
do so (Zajac, Golden and Shortell, 1991). Hence, our second hypothesis reads: 
H2: The more concentrated the ownership structure, the less radical 
innovations can be achieved by CVs.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The underlying database is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey which 
is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf 
of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) since 1993. The MIP 
is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European 
Commission which is designed to collect harmonized data on innovation in the European 
Community. The CIS is in accordance with the OSLO manual, which defines 
international guidelines for collecting innovation data from the business sector (Eurostat 
and OECD 2005).5 
For our study, we focus on the German manufacturing sector in the period 1993-
2007. We only consider firms that have been founded in 1990 or later because we are not 
interested in established ventures. In addition, we introduce the restriction that firms 
cannot be larger than 50 employees at the time of their foundations as we intend to avoid 
a misclassification of new production plants as new ventures. This cut off point is 
proposed by Almus, Engel and Prantl (2000), Engel and Fryges (2002) as well as Fritsch 
(1992). Further, we checked the ventures’ names in order to exclude production plants 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of the CIS, see e.g. Eurostat (2004). 
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that are not captured by our cut off point. Altogether, this leaves us with a final sample of 
5,986 venture-year observations corresponding to 2,451 different ventures. Note that the 
MIP has a pooled cross sectional structure which does not allow us to conduct meaningful 
panel econometrics: 47 percent of the firms in the sample are only observed once.6 To 
attain information on the corporate structure of German manufacturing firms, we linked 
the MIP data to the database of CREDITREFORM, which is the largest German credit 
rating agency. CREDITREFORM collects information about basically all firms in 
Germany in order to predict the probability of default for the firms in question. This 
information is used by potential lenders, such as banks and suppliers (Czarnitzki and 
Kraft 2007). By means of the CREDITREFORM database, we identify ventures that have 
at least one corporate shareholder at the time of their foundation (CVs) and ventures that 
start off without any company backing. The latter type of venture will be referred to as 
IVs in the following. In total, almost one quarter of the observations in our sample (1,421 
out of 5,986) are CVs. Our parent firms (owners) have, on average, 6,598 employees, 
which makes us confident that we indeed have incumbent parent companies in our 
database.7  
Furthermore, the CREDITREFORM database contains information regarding the 
ventures’ ownership structure. A list of all shareholders and the size of their shares is 
available to us. This information allows us to test for the effect of ownership 
concentration on venture innovativeness. Lastly, we can differentiate between different 
types of investors like individual investors, firm investors in manufacturing and the 
service sector, foreign investors, financial investors and others.  
                                                 
6 Table 6 in Appendix A shows the structure of the unbalanced panel. 
7 One example of an incumbent firm in our dataset would be the Jenoptik AG (10,400 employees), which is 
specialized in photonic and mechatronic technologies. Jenoptik AG set up a CV, called Jenoptik 
Mikrotechnik Gmbh. This venture, which is also based in Jena, is creating manufacturing systems for 
polymeric microcomponents and nanostructures.  
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3.1. Variable Description 
3.1.1. Dependent Variables 
Our dependent variables measure the innovation performance of CVs and IVs. 
Within the MIP survey, respondents are requested to classify their sales into three types: 
A) products introduced in the recent three years that were new to their main product 
market, B) products introduced in the recent three years that were not new to their main 
product market, but only new to the firm’s product portfolio, and C) sales due to 
unchanged or marginally changed products. This implies that a venture’s total sales is the 
sum of sales with A, B and C (total sales = A+B+C). Since we are only interested in a 
venture’s innovation sales in our empirical analysis, we only consider product sales of 
types A and B. In particular, we distinguish between total innovation sales as the 
ventures’ sales with products of types A and B (INNO), innovation sales generated by 
market novelties as sales generated by type A sales (NOVEL) and the ventures’ sales with 
incremental innovations as described by type B innovations (INCRE). We consider 
market novelties as radical innovations that the ventures have developed and introduced 
to the market. In order to account for differences in total sales we divide our innovation 
sales measures by the total sales of the venture. As an example, radical innovation sales 
(NOVEL) is calculated as: A/(A+B+C). The advantage of distinguishing between 
different innovation types allows us to be closer to the theoretical literature that focuses 
on the importance of corporate venturing for radical innovations (e.g. Hill and 
Rothaermel 2003, Stringer 2000). Previous empirical studies on CVs and innovation use 
qualitative information to construct measures for the radicalness of CVs’ innovativeness 
(Day 1994, Zahra 1996, Zahra and George 1999, Zahra and Bogner 1999). Our variables, 
in contrast, present sales figures for different types of innovations. 
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3.1.2 Independent Variables 
We distinguish between CVs and IVs by means of a binary variable, which takes 
the value one if a venture has at least one corporate shareholder at the time of foundation 
and zero otherwise (CV). Since we are also interested in the relationship between 
ownership concentration and innovativeness, we calculated a Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index (HHI) of ownership concentration at the time of the ventures’ foundation. We 
calculated the HHI as the sum of squared shares that parent firms hold in their ventures. 
The index takes the value one for the highest possible degree of ownership concentration. 
In that case the venture has only one investor. Since also IVs could be owned by more 
than one individual, the concentration variable does not need to be equal to one for the 
control group. As we are primarily interested in the impact of ownership concentration on 
the innovativeness of CVs, we include an interaction term 
(CV×Ownership_Concentration).  
We also create a set of dummy variables to distinguish between different types of 
co-investors that our CVs can have in addition to corporations. The reason we do this is 
because different investors may follow different objectives when taking a share in a new 
venture. Besides corporate owners from the manufacturing sector, our ventures can also 
have owners from the financial sector (holdings, banks, and insurances) or the service 
sector. Similarly, we control for foreign owners and other owners like foundations, 
municipalities, the government etc.  
Moreover, we include several control variables. Venture size is measured by 
employment (Size). We account for venture age as well. Young ventures might turn out to 
be more innovative than older ones because the start up phase usually coincides with the 
commercialization of innovations. Since both the age and employment distributions are 
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skewed, we use the logarithm of the two variables in all regression models. In addition, 
we control for R&D investment by taking the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales 
(R&D intensity).  
Right after Germany’s reunification in 1990, eastern German firms received various 
tax incentives and subsidies from the government in order to promote their development 
(Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004b). To account for this, we add a dummy variable (East) that 
takes the value one for ventures operating in Eastern Germany and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we include four different cohorts based on the ventures’ years of 
establishment and also add a full set of time dummies to control for business cycle effects. 
Heterogeneity across sectors not captured by any of the variables mentioned above is 
accounted for by 12 industry dummies (see Table 7 in Appendix A). 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Our final sample consists of 5,986 observations for German manufacturing firms. 
24 percent (1,421) of these observations are CVs in the sense that they had at least one 
corporate shareholder at the time of foundation. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of 
our final sample.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The descriptive statistics show that CVs are more innovative than IVs as is reflected 
by the higher mean values for all three innovation measures. CVs, for instance, make 21 
percent of their sales with innovative products whereas IVs earn only 16 percent of their 
total sales with innovations. The distinction between radical and incremental innovation 
reveals that both CVs and IVs are, on average, more engaged in incremental innovations 
than in radical innovations. Furthermore, the ownership concentration of CVs is 
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significantly higher than the one for IVs. CVs have a higher R&D intensity than IVs and 
are, on average, twice as large in terms of employment. This underlines the fact that CVs 
are likely to have better access to resources. Finally, the descriptive statistics reveal that 
70 percent of all CVs have at least one manufacturing co-investor and 37 percent a co-
investor from the financial sector. Service sector co-investors are relatively rare but about 
a third of the ventures have a foreign co-investor.  
4. Empirical Results 
For our empirical analysis tobit models are estimated to account for the fact that our 
innovation sales variables are censored at zero percent as there are firms that have no 
sales with radical or improved innovations. We also account for right censoring as the 
maximum of the dependent variables is 100 percent. The resulting empirical model can 
be written as: 
 
ititit uXy  '*  (1) 
 
where y* is the unobserved latent variable that presents radical, incremental or total 
innovation sales respectively. iX  represents the vector of regressors, β are the 
coefficients to be estimated and u is the disturbance term. The observed dependent 
variable is: 
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One characteristic of standard Tobit models is that they assume homoscedasticity. If 
this assumption is not satisfied, the estimated coefficients are inconsistent (Greene 2005). 
Consequently, we estimate heteroscedastic Tobit models, in which the homoscedastic 
standard error  is replaced by   'exp itit W  in the likelihood function, where W 
denotes a set of regressors possibly causing heteroscedasticity and α are the additional 
coefficients to be estimated. We use three size class dummies based on the distribution of 
the ventures’ size in terms of employment and 12 industry dummies to model groupwise 
heteroscedasticity. Wald tests indicate heteroscedasticity for all but two of our regression 
models (test results are reported at the bottom of the regression tables). Therefore, we 
only report the heteroscedastic estimation results.8 As some firms appear more than once 
in our sample, we calculate clustered standard errors. 
4.1. The innovation performance of CVs versus IVs 
The first step is to empirically estimate the innovativeness of CVs as compared to 
the control group of IVs in a multivariate setting. This means that we regress the three 
innovation measures on the CV variable and the set of control variables. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The results show that CVs have higher total innovation sales (INNO) than IVs as 
the positive coefficient of the dummy variable indicates. If we distinguish between sales 
with radical innovations (NOVEL) and sales with incremental innovations (INCRE) an 
interesting difference appears. Whereas CVs do better in terms of sales with radical 
                                                 
8 Our results do not change if we estimate these two regression specifications with homoscedastic tobit 
models. 
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innovations, there is no evidence that CVs are superior in developing incremental 
innovations. Accordingly, CVs favor radical innovations, which could be explained by 
the argument that they are often created with the explicit aim of creating radical 
innovations. Furthermore, CVs have access to the resources of their parents, which are 
necessary for enhancing the innovation process and creating radical innovations 
(Thompson 1965). The marginal effect of the CV dummy (calculated as a discrete jump 
from 0 to 1) amounts to 1.46 percentage points, all else constant. As the sample mean of 
radical innovation sales is 4.9 percent, this is a sizeable impact. Overall, the results 
support our first hypothesis, stating that CVs are more successful at innovating radically 
than IVs.  
Regarding the control variables, we find that the relationship between the dependent 
variable and R&D intensity turns out to be an inversely U-shaped curve. However, the 
curve peaks at the 99th percentile of the R&D distribution. Thus, we basically find a 
positive relationship with decreasing marginal returns.  
Furthermore, it can be seen that venture size has a significantly positive impact on 
all three innovation measures. Large ventures cannot only profit from economies of scale 
and scope but are also more likely to realize complementarities between different 
departments of the firm (Galbraith 1952). Contrary to our expectations, older ventures 
appear to be more innovative. However, the estimated coefficient is only significant at the 
10 percent level for radical innovations and is insignificant for incremental innovations. 
Venture location only seems to matter for radical innovations. The reason for this result 
might be that Eastern German firms have not been able to close the gap after reunification 
and remained less innovative than Western German firms during the transformation 
process of Eastern Germany into a market economy (Czarnitzki and Kraft 2006).  
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Lastly, year dummies are jointly significant throughout all three regression models 
as Wald tests at the bottom of Table 2 show. Interestingly, the industry dummies are not 
jointly significant in the radical innovation model. This reassures our model specification 
as we do not find unobserved heterogeneity across sectors. It appears that our included 
regressors account decently for the variation of the dependent variable. The founding 
cohort dummies are only weakly significant if at all.  
4.2. Does ownership concentration of CVs matter? 
In order to investigate whether the capital concentration of CVs matters for the 
innovation process, we add ownership concentration and an interaction term of ownership 
concentration and the CV dummy to our previous specification. The results of the 
heteroscedastic tobit models are reported in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
As in Table 2, CVs are superior in terms of total innovation sales (INNO) and 
radical innovation sales (NOVEL).  By taking the ownership concentration of the CVs 
into consideration, we observe a significantly negative effect on total innovation sales and 
on radical innovation sales. Hence, CVs’ sales with radical innovations decrease with the 
degree of ownership concentration, yielding support for our second hypothesis. This 
result indicates barriers to radical innovativeness for CVs with only a few influential 
shareholders. A high ownership concentration seems to motivate the owners to use their 
control rights and exert power and control on their ventures (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 
1997, Aghion and Tirole 1997, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2009). By doing this, however, the 
autonomy of the CVs is narrowed and they are inhibited from being innovative (Ginsberg 
and Hay 1994, Zahra 1996). Accordingly, we can conclude that CVs are less effective in 
terms of radical innovativeness if their autonomy is constrained.  
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There are two additional observations to be mentioned. First, the degree of 
ownership concentration does not impact the incremental innovation activities of CVs, 
which is reflected by the insignificant coefficient estimate in Model 6. Since incremental 
innovations are known to be less risky than radical innovations (Henderson and Clark 
1990, Damanpour 1996), it can be assumed that corporate owners have fewer incentives 
to monitor and control these venture activities (Holmstrom 1989). Second, ownership 
concentration does not matter in general. The coefficient of the ownership concentration 
variable is much smaller than the coefficient of the interaction term and not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that corporate capital holders in particular exert 
significant control on the venture. We further investigate the relationship between owner 
type and innovativeness of the venture in the next subsection. 
As the tobit model is non-linear, it is instructive to study the marginal effect of 
ownership concentration on radical innovation, the CV dummy and their interaction term 
over the whole range of the ownership concentration distribution. Figure 1 depicts the 
expected values of the radical innovation measure for both CVs and IVs as a function of 
the ventures’ ownership concentration. The predictions are based on Model 5 in Table 3 
and are calculated at the means of all other regressors.  
As the marginal effect of ownership concentration per se is negative but not 
significantly different from zero, we obtain almost a flat relationship for the IVs. As 
Figure 1 shows, however, the curve for CVs is shifted upwards because of the positive 
CV dummy. The positive difference between CVs and IVs diminishes as ownership 
concentration of the former increases, though.  
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The estimated coefficients of the other control variables do not change significantly 
in sign and magnitude if compared to the results for the first specification presented in 
Table 2. 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
4.3. Does the type of owner matter? 
As not all of our CVs have only corporate owners at the time of their foundation, 
this section accounts for the possibility that different investor types may take a stake in 
new ventures for different reasons. While financial investors are presumably interested in 
achieving short term financial gains, corporate investors are presumably more focused on 
spurring radical innovations through CVs (Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan 1988, 
Dushnitzky and Lenox 2005). Accordingly, corporate investors can be argued to be 
driven by strategic motives other than achieving profits in the short term. In order to 
control for the fact that different owners follow different motivations, which could 
possibly be reflected in the innovativeness of their ventures, we incorporate four owner 
dummies in our regression models (Table 4). These dummy variables take into account 
that at the time of their foundation, the ventures might have co-investors from service 
firms, foreign firms or financial firms. The last category depicts a residual group of 
different owners including foundations, municipalities, the government and others. 
Manufacturing firms serve as the benchmark type of owners. 
Insert Table 4 about here  
In all three regression models the four owner dummies are insignificant with the 
exception of the financial owner dummy in Model 8. The financial owner dummy has a 
significantly negative impact on sales with radical innovations. Hence, CVs’ radical 
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innovativeness is lower if they also have financial owners (Hoskisson et al. 2002, Tribo, 
Berrone and Surroca, 2007). A likely explanation for this result is that financial owners 
are mainly driven by short term financial goals rather than by motives related to 
innovation. To maximize the chances that these goals are achieved, financial owners may 
have a strong interest to monitor their ventures and pressure them into following an 
intended course of action. This lack of autonomy, however, lowers the CVs’ share of 
sales with radical products.  
All other estimation results are robust regarding the signs and magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients. The only notable change is that the CV dummy for incremental 
innovations is not significant at the 10 percent level anymore.  
4.4. Robustness check I: Endogeneity of CV variable 
We performed two robustness checks concerning potential endogeneity of the CV 
variable in Table 2. In case of external corporate venturing9, it could be that parent 
companies systematically invest in ventures that promise higher innovativeness making 
the CV variable endogenous. First, we perform a non-parametric nearest neighbor 
matching as it is common in treatment effects studies (see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009 for a methodological overview). We match CVs with comparable IVs and test 
whether the differences regarding the innovation performance of the matched sample is 
statistically significant. The results confirmed our previous findings: CVs are more 
innovative in terms of radical and total innovation sales. We present the results in Table 9 
in Appendix B along with a description of the matching procedure (Table 8). 
                                                 
9 External CVs refers to equity investments that facilitate the foundation of external start up companies 
(Miles and Covin, 2002).  
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Whereas an advantage of the matching is that it doesn’t rely on functional form 
assumptions, a drawback is that it can only control for selection on observables. In order 
to check robustness concerning selection on unobservables, we estimate an instrumental 
variable model where the CV variable is treated as an endogenous regressor. 
Heteroscedastic Tobit instrumental variable models are estimated using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood. 
We use two different instruments. First, we use a dummy variable indicating 
whether the CEO of the venture owns real estate at the time of firm foundation. In case 
the CEO owns securities, she is more likely to approach a bank instead of a corporate 
investor to finance a radical innovation project. By doing so, the CEO avoids a loss of 
control over the venture. Second, the likelihood to engage in corporate venturing at the 
industry level is used. If corporate venturing is a common practice in a certain industry, 
our sample firms are expected to be more likely to engage in corporate venturing 
themselves. The key assumption behind industry level instruments is that the unobserved 
firm characteristics do not significantly affect the industry variables (see e.g. Jaffe 1986).  
Staiger and Stock (1997) emphasize that instrumental variable regressions and 
endogeneity tests can be misleading in case of weak instruments. They propose 
evaluating the partial correlation of the endogenous variable and the instruments as a test 
for weak instruments. As a rule of thumb, the partial F-statistic for the instrument(s) 
should be larger than 10 to ensure that instruments are not weak. Our instruments have 
the expected sign in the first stage regression. The real estate dummy has a negative sign 
and is significant at the 1 percent level. The industry mean of corporate venturing activity 
is positively significant at the 1 percent level. The partial F-statistic on joint significance 
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amounts to 152.83. Thus we can reject the concern that our regressions suffer from 
possible weak instrument bias.  
Based on a Smith and Blundell (1986) test for endogeneity, we reject exogeneity of 
the CV variable. In order to test whether our instruments are valid, i.e. exogenous, we 
performed a Sargan test, which did not reject the Null hypothesis of validity of our 
instrumental variables. The regression results are presented in Table 10 in Appendix B. 
The models confirm our previous findings that CVs are more successful in terms of 
radical innovation than IVs. 
4.5. Robustness check 2: restricting the analysis to CVs  
Up until now our regressions are based on the full sample of manufacturing 
ventures including CVs and IVs. As a robustness check, we re-run the regressions for the 
subsample of 1,421 CV observations (Table 5). We do this to show that our results 
regarding the ownership concentration and the owner types in Table 4 are not driven by 
the control group of IVs. The estimation results of all three regression models (model 10 
– model 12) are consistent with previous findings. A high capital concentration 
diminishes the radical innovativeness of CVs. For incremental innovations, however, the 
CVs’ capital concentration has no significant effect, as was apparent from the previous 
results already. Finally, CVs with at least one financial owner are less innovative than 
CVs with only manufacturing owners.  
We also considered the possibility that the venture’s ownership concentration could 
be endogenous. Radical innovation projects are known to be quite risky. As a result, 
inventors might approach incumbent firms so that the risk of the project is spread and its 
financing assured. If this explanation holds, our results would be subject to reverse 
causality. We created two variables, serving as instrumental variables. The instrumental 
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variables capture the average firm ownership concentration per 2-digit NACE industry 
level. We distinguish between Eastern and Western Germany as ownership structures in 
the Eastern part are likely to be influenced by the reunification which resulted in the 
privatization of formerly public companies. These variables account for industry 
heterogeneity in terms of demand for innovation, innovation conditions and the 
associated risk which influences ownership structures. We find that our instruments are 
relevant in the first stage regression since the partial F-statistic amounts to 23.28. A 
Sargan test did not reject the validity of the two instruments. Performing a Smith-
Blundell test, however, revealed that exogeneity of ownership concentration could not be 
rejected at any significance level. Consequently, we did not estimate instrumental 
variable models.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Established firms have often been found to be less innovative than industry entrants 
(Schumpeter, 1942, Rosenbloom and Cusumano 1987, Utterback 1994, Christensen 
1997). Reasons for this have been classified as being of an economic, organizational or 
strategic nature (Christensen 1997, Hill and Rothaermel 2003). Especially the 
development of radical innovations, which requires a high degree of organizational and 
technological flexibility, is a challenge for many established firms. Recent literature has 
proposed corporate venturing as a way to overcome inertial forces hampering radical 
innovation in incumbent firms (Day 1994, Christensen 1997, Stringer 2000, Hill and 
Rothaermel 2003, Vanhaverbeke and Peters 2005, Covin and Miles 2007, Maine 2008).  
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In this paper we investigate the innovativeness of CVs in comparison to a 
subsample of IVs. Our sample of German manufacturing firms in the period 1993-2007 
allows us to distinguish between radical innovations and improvements on existing 
products. The first part of our analysis shows that CVs are more innovative than IVs with 
respect to radical innovations (hypothesis 1). The access to the resources of the parent 
companies might be a factor driving this result. In the second part of the study, we 
investigate if the ventures’ superior access to resources is outweighed by the parent 
companies’ controlling needs. If the operational freedom of the ventures is limited, we 
would expect a negative impact on their innovativeness. Our results show that the CVs’ 
commitment to radical innovations decreases with increasing ownership concentration 
(hypothesis 2). This supports the argument that a high ownership concentration sets 
incentives for increased monitoring efforts by the owners (e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft 2009). 
As a result, however, CVs lose the freedom to invest in radical innovation projects.  
Our finding has important management implications. The results suggest that 
incumbent firms could benefit from setting up CVs that have the autonomy to invest in 
radical innovation projects. This is because the inventions that the CVs develop can 
presumably spur the innovation process of established companies. But incumbent 
companies should not exert too much control on their ventures if they don’t want to 
jeopardize their innovativeness (Shrader and Simon 1997). In particular, the decision 
rights for innovation projects should be granted to the venture (Aghion and Tirole 1997). 
A more flexible handle of CVs, however, also increases agency problems. Hence, it is a 
challenge for corporate investors to balance control over the venture in order to limit 
opportunistic behavior against the venture’s operational independence which is essential 
for radical innovations. In other words, the corporate investor must balance risk-bearing 
 27
of the venture management against incentives to act in the corporate investor’s interest 
must be reached.  
The theoretical literature on principal-agents conflicts proposes several solutions to 
this problem (Miller 2005). These models are typically based on a production function 
that transforms executive efforts into output. The output is also influenced by the 
[venture] manager’s utility function, her risk-aversion and effort-aversion. If the venture 
manager is risk-averse the corporate investor would need to set incentives to induce the 
investment in risky projects. Otherwise, the venture manager would prefer less risky 
projects like investments in physical assets. In this case, the corporate investor has to 
impact the allocation of resources within the venture. If the venture management is effort-
averse the corporate investor has to “motivate” the venture management. Depending on 
the context, the theoretical literature proposes monitoring, tournaments, high management 
wages and collaborative solutions between principal and agent as possible measures 
against principal-agent problems. It should be kept in mind though that the theoretical 
models do not always have an explicit focus on innovative projects. In particular, the 
models do not consider that radical R&D projects are characterized by a high degree of 
outcome uncertainty which is independent of the venture manager’s risk aversion or 
effort input. Nevertheless, some solutions to the principal-agent problem can be applied 
to the context of corporate entrepreneurship.  
Is monitoring the venture a solution? And if so, how should a venture be 
monitored? Monitoring diminishes information asymmetries between corporate investor 
and venture. However, monitoring does not always lead to valuable information for the 
corporate sponsor. This is the case if the venture management is risk-neutral and if we 
can only observe the outcome of the venture’s innovation activities but not the invested 
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effort level. In this scenario, an outcome-based contract can be written that induces 
optimal efforts (Harris and Raviv 1979). Monitoring would hence be a waste of resources. 
Gains from monitoring, however, can be derived if the venture management is risk-averse 
and effort-averse. In this scenario, a (second-best) contract implies that the risk-averse 
venture management takes some risk at the cost of non-efficient risk sharing (Harris and 
Raviv 1979, Shavell 1979, Holmstrom 1979, Miller 2005). In other words, the venture 
management’s compensation should be tied to the riskiness of the project so that the 
management has incentives to invest in radical innovation projects.  
Alternatively the literature proposes tournaments (e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983). 
The problem with monitoring is that agents typically dislike that their actions are 
observed and potentially punished. The tournament solution, in contrast, is based on the 
relative performance of different agents and on rewards for the best performer such as 
promotions or bonus payments. We consider this solution as not applicable to the context 
of corporate venturing. The reason is that a necessary pre-condition for the tournament 
solution would be that all agents face a similar risk so that their relative performance is 
informative. This is typically not the case in the context of corporate venturing because 
different ventures are associated with different risk levels. For the same reason, a 
tournament between the management of the venture and management units of the 
sponsoring firm would not work out either because the former should bears more risk 
than the latter.  
Another possible solution would be to pay the venture management higher wages 
than are offered by the market. Higher wages not only make the best managers compete 
for the job but also make them spare no effort to keep it. The implication is that the 
authority of the corporate investor would be strong as the venture management wants to 
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avoid dismissal. Consequently, the venture management would be willing to accept more 
directions from the corporate investor and would also be more open for monitoring. In 
other words, the agent accepts giving up some operational freedom over the venture. 
Hence, we suggest that this solution is only applicable to the case of corporate venturing 
if there is a contract in place that enforces the investment in radical innovation projects at 
the same time.   
Other theoretical models question whether any action by the principal is needed to 
avoid principal-agent problems. Given that the theoretical, contract based models 
typically lead to inferior second best solutions, where either risk-sharing or effort level 
are suboptimal, some scholars emphasize the importance of management skills to 
mitigate principal-agent problems rather than relying on contractual solutions. Akerlof 
(1982) for instance argues that leniency, in our case greater venture autonomy, leads to a 
performance above the minimum expectations as defined by the principal. The author 
interprets this result as a gift to the principal to reward leniency. An alternative argument 
against intervention by the corporate investor is put forward by Radner (1985). He argues 
that if principal-agent problems are considered as a repeated game, agency losses can be 
recaptured over time. With respect to corporate venturing, it has to be kept in mind 
though that ventures do not necessarily have a long-term perspective, which influences 
their incentive structure. This would then question the applicability of a repeated games 
or leniency framework to the case of corporate venturing. 
In summary, it appears advisable to the corporate investor to not only limit control 
but also to employ monitoring means that reward risk-taking behavior by the venture 
management. 
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As any, our study is not free of limitations. First of all, we rely on ownership 
concentration as a measure for control that is exerted on the venture. Although this is 
common practice in the empirical literature (e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004, 2009, Kraft 
and Niederprüm 1999, Leech and Leahy 1991), one has to keep in mind that this variable 
can only serve as a proxy for ownership control. Second, it would be desirable to move 
beyond a cross-sectional analysis. Unfortunately, our database does not allow 
longitudinal investigations, as a large proportion of ventures is only observed once in the 
sample. Furthermore, our focus is limited to the innovation performance of the venture. It 
would be interesting for future research to investigate potential learning effects for the 
parent company through corporate venturing (Dushnitzky and Lenox 2005). Another 
possible venue for future research would be to have a closer look at the different types of 
ventures. In particular, a distinction between external and internal corporate venturing 
projects would be interesting as the level of independence from the corporate investor 
should be different for both venture types. A related topic concerns the management and 
inventive labor force. It would be of interest to investigate the impact of insider versus 
outsider managers on the success of the venture. Another relevant question would be if 
the ownership of CVs changes over time. Do corporate investors integrate the venture 
after it proved to be successful? Do they keep it independent or do they rather sell it and 
invest in a new venture?  
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Appendix A: Panel Structure and Industry Classification 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 shows how our 5961 venture year observations, which correspond to 2451 
ventures, are distributed over the 15 year time frame of our study (1993-2007). It can be 
seen that 1150 ventures are only observed once in the sample. Similarly, 3 ventures 
appear 14 times.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Appendix B: Robustness Tests 
As has already been explained before, we performed an econometric matching as a 
first robustness test for our basic model. For each firm in our sample, we search for the 
nearest neighbor in the control sample of IVs by means of a Mahalanobis distance 
matching. Table 8 provides details on how we implemented the matching for this study.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
The matching results can be found in Table 9. It can be seen that the heterogeneity 
in the characteristics, which was apparent in the descriptive statistics for the full sample 
(Table 1), vanishes as the two groups of firms are balanced by nearest neighbor matching. 
For all of our 1,421 CVs, we picked one nearest neighbor out of the pool of IVs. Now the 
two samples are comparable in terms of all control variables that have been used to 
estimate the probit model, i.e. firm size, R&D intensity, firm age etc. After having 
eliminated differences between CVs and IVs that can be traced back to their firm 
characteristics, CVs are still more innovative in terms of total innovation sales and radical 
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innovation sales. Hence, we can conclude that the superior innovativeness of CVs is 
driven by the presence of a corporate investor rather than by systematic differences 
between ventures. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
To account for possible endogeneity of the CV variable, we estimate 
heteroscedastic instrumental variable Tobits. The estimation results are displayed in Table 
10. It can be seen that the presence of a corporate investor still has a significantly positive 
impact on total innovation sales and radical innovation sales. Compared to the 
heteroscedastic Tobit regressions in Table 2, however, the significance level has changed 
and the CV dummies are now only significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the 
results show that CVs can also have a weakly significant effect on incremental innovation 
sales. Most of the other estimation results are as expected. Accordingly, the results in 
Table 2 are mainly supported by our instrumental variable approach.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Corporate Ventures 
 (N = 1421)  
Independent Ventures  
(N = 4565) 
Variables Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
NOVEL 6.74 16.75 0 100 4.37 13.69 0 100 
INCRE 14.73 24.05 0 100 11.32 21.83 0 100 
INNO 21.47 29.98 0 100 15.69 26.75 0 100 
Ownership Concentration 0.75 0.30 0.06 1 0.63 0.26 0.01 1 
R&D Intensity 3.85 9.82 0 90.91 3.05 8.23 0 100 
Size 117.77 253.79 1 5000 44.72 169.29 1 4700 
Age 9.58 4.09 0 18 9.29 4.50 0 18 
Founding Cohort1 0.57 0.49 0 1 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Founding Cohort2 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Founding Cohort3 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1 
East 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Manufacturing Owner 0.70 0.46 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Financial Owner 0.37 0.48 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Service Owner 0.07 0.25 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Foreign Owner 0.30 0.46 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Other Owner 0.07 0.26 0 1  0 0 0 0 
Note: Industry dummies and year dummies are omitted       
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Table 2: Heteroscedastic Tobit Regressions on Innovation Performance of CVs 
versus IVs 
Endogenous Variables INNO NOVEL  INCRE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CV 6.64*** 7.08*** 3.66 
 (2.46) (1.98) (2.4) 
log(Size) 7.71*** 5.28*** 8.37*** 
 (0.84) (0.78) (0.84) 
log(Age) 9.42** 6.29* 6.51 
 (4.37) (3.6) (4.1) 
R&D Intensity 4.44*** 2.94*** 3.99*** 
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.31) 
R&D Intensity^2 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
East -1.15 -7.99*** 3.64* 
 (2.1) (1.82) (2.03) 
Intercept -54.01*** -63.21*** -68.06*** 
  (8.38) (13.59) (8.52) 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (11)  53.20*** 9.68 40.89*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (14) 136.59*** 53.76*** 149.93*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Founding Cohorts, χ2 (3) 7.01* 7.53* 5.07 
Test on Heteroscedasticity, χ2 (14) 31.77*** 19.92 35.40*** 
Log-Likelihood -14808.8 -8320.36 -12920.25 
Observations 5986 5986 5986 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
The heteroscedasticity term includes the three size class dummies based on the ventures' employment and 
the industry dummies.  
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Table 3: Heteroscedastic Tobit Regressions on the Effect of Ownership 
Concentration on Innovation 
Endogenous Variables INNO NOVEL INCRE 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CV 17.55*** 17.15*** 11.16* 
 (5.94) (4.75) (6.11) 
Ownership Concentration -3.24 -0.95 -2.53 
 (4.92) (3.98) (4.64) 
CV x concentration -14.37* -13.81** -9.76 
 (7.99) (6.36) (8.01) 
Log(Size) 8.12*** 5.72*** 8.63*** 
 (0.87) (0.79) (0.86) 
Log(Age) 9.56** 6.63* 6.70 
 (4.36) (3.60) (4.10) 
R&D Intensity 4.41*** 2.91*** 3.96*** 
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.31) 
R&D Intensity^2 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
East -1.64 -8.27*** 3.26 
 (2.12) (1.82) (2.04) 
Intercept -52.46*** -63.30*** -66.68***
  (9.02) (13.92) (9.10) 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (11) 52.39*** 9.46 40.36*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (13) 138.21*** 54.84*** 150.46***
Test of Joint Significance of Founding Cohorts, χ2 (3) 7.29* 7.54* 5.37 
Test on Heteroscedasticity, χ2 (14) 33.18*** 23.44* 35.34*** 
Log-Likelihood -14799.95 -8312.28 -12915.81
Observations 5986 5986 5986 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
The heteroscedasticity term includes the three size class dummies based on the ventures' employment and 
the industry dummies.  
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Table 4: Heteroscedastic Tobit Regressions on the Effect of Ownership 
Concentration and Different Owner Types 
Endogenous Variables INNO NOVEL INCRE 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
CV 18.79*** 21.75*** 9.30 
 (6.61) (5.25) (6.85) 
Ownership Concentration -3.21 -1.02 -2.51 
 (4.92) (3.98) (4.63) 
CV x concentration -16.45** -17.31*** -9.86 
 (8.23) (6.46) (8.28) 
Log(Size) 8.01*** 5.75*** 8.49*** 
 (0.87) (0.79) (0.87) 
Log(Age) 9.61** 6.85* 6.72* 
 (4.36) (3.59) (4.09) 
R&D Intensity 4.42*** 2.92*** 3.96*** 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.31) 
R&D Intensity^2 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
East -1.43 -8.19*** 3.42* 
 (2.15) (1.82) (2.06) 
Financial Owner -0.68 -6.18** 3.44 
 (3.84) (2.97) (3.91) 
Foreign Owner 4.18 3.15 3.26 
 (3.91) (3.07) (3.90) 
Service Owner -5.34 -6.20 -1.66 
 (7.42) (6.02) (6.56) 
Unknown Owner Type -4.19 -4.47 -1.67 
 (5.45) (5.43) (7.04) 
Intercept -51.73*** -63.03*** -65.73*** 
  (9.00) (13.87) (9.08) 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (11) 52.55*** 9.81 40.60*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (13) 137.63***  55.49*** 149.95*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Founding Cohorts, χ2 (3) 7.42* 7.95** 5.59 
Test on Heteroscedasticity, χ2 (14) 32.57*** 24.23** 35.98*** 
Log-Likelihood -14797.75 -8305.83 -12914.08 
Observations 5986 5986 5986 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
The heteroscedasticity term includes the three size class dummies based on the ventures' employment and 
the industry dummies. 
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Table 5: Heteroscedastic Tobit Regressions on the Effect of Ownership 
Concentration and Different Owner Types (Subsample of CVs) 
Endogenous Variables INNO NOVEL INCRE 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Ownerhship Concentration -18.66*** -16.55*** -9.99 
 (6.60) (5.46) (6.81) 
Log(Size) 7.49*** 6.18*** 7.01*** 
 (1.32) (1.63) (1.38) 
Log(Age) -0.59 1.26 -2.38 
 (7.75) (5.21) (7.19) 
R&D Intensity 3.79*** 2.63*** 2.71*** 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.40) 
R&D Intensity^2 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
East -2.74 -7.45** 3.05 
 (3.76) (3.38) (3.88) 
Financial Owner 0.84 -6.27** 5.59 
 (3.71) (2.89) (3.77) 
Foreign Owner 2.05 0.77 2.84 
 (3.85) (3.95) (3.99) 
Service Owner -4.92 -6.25 -0.83 
 (6.73) (5.40) (6.02) 
Unknown Owner -3.32 -2.77 0.04 
 (4.97) (4.81) (6.22) 
Intercept -3.38 -0.43 -36.06** 
  (12.78) (11.90) (16.22) 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (11)  42.99*** 9.55 42.81*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (13) 36.60*** 20.78 47.77*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Founding Cohorts, χ2 (3) 4.19 11.14** 2.65 
Test on Heteroscedasticity, χ2 (14) 44.78*** 19.06 31.45*** 
Log-Likelihood -4144.71 -2506.33 -3597.08 
Observations 1421 1421 1421 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
The heteroscedasticity term includes the three size class dummies based on the ventures' employment and 
the industry dummies. 
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Table 6: Structure of the Unbalanced Panel (1993-2007) 
Number of yearly 
observations 
Number of observations 
per Venture Percentage 
1 1,150 46.92 
2 542 22.11 
3 273 11.14 
4 168 6.85 
5 99 4.04 
6 72 2.94 
7 37 1.51 
8 30 1.22 
9 24 0.98 
10 24 0.98 
11 14 0.57 
12 12 0.49 
13 3 0.12 
14 3 0.12 
15 0 0 
Total 2451 100 
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Table 7:  Industry Classification 
Industry  Description  
1 Food and Beverages 
2 Textiles, clothes and leather goods 
3 Wood, paper, publishing and printing 
4 Fuels and chemicals 
5 Rubber and plastic products 
6 Non–metallic mineral products 
7 Basic and fabricated metals 
8 Machinery and equipment 
9 Office and communication equipment, electrical machinery and components 
10 Medical and optical instruments 
11 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 
12 Furniture products and n.e.c. 
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Table 8: The Matching Protocol 
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain propensity scores )(XP

. 
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms 
(corporate ventures) with probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the 
minimum in the potential control group. 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of CVs and delete it from that pool. 
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all independent ventures 
in order to find the most similar control observation. 
    ' 1ij j i j iMD Z Z Z Z     
 In our case, Z contains the estimated propensity score.   is the empirical covariance 
matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential controls. 
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining sample. (Do 
not remove the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be 
used again.) 
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations in the sample of CVs. 
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect of having a corporate 
investor can simply be calculated as the mean difference of the matched samples: 
1 T C
TT i iT
i i
ˆˆ Y Y
n
        
with 
C
iY

 being the counterfactual for i and nT is the sample size (of treated firms). 
Note that the same observation may appear more than once in the selected control 
group. 
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, 
an ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the 
appearance of repeated observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the 
standard errors in order to draw conclusions on statistical inference. We follow 
Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the 
standard errors. 
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Table 9: Matching Results 
 CVs Matched Control Group p-value of two-sided 
 N1= 1421 N0= 1421 t test on mean differences 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.      
R&D Intensity 3.85 9.82 3.86 9.77 0.98 
R&D Intensity^2 111.15 596.20 110.23 682.11 0.98 
log(Size) 3.86 1.27 3.91 1.34 0.39 
log(Age) 2.27 0.47 2.23 0.49 0.12 
East 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.48 0.56 
INNO 21.46 29.98 19.19 27.46 0.088* 
NOVEL 6.74 16.75 4.90 12.92 0.006*** 
INCRE 14.73 24.05 14.28 22.88 0.69 
Notes: industry dummies, year dummies and founding cohorts are not reported. t-statistics are based on 
Lechner's (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with 
replacement in the selected control group. 
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Table 10: Heteroskedastic IV Tobit Regressions on the Effect of Corporate 
Venturing 
Endogenous Variables INNO NOVEL INCRE 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
CV 25.20** 26.76** 22.25* 
 (12.01) (10.46) (11.43) 
log(Size) 4.81*** 1.78 4.93*** 
 (1.48) (1.29) (1.42) 
log(Age) 7.49* 4.15 4.67 
 (4.37) (3.90) (4.19) 
R&D Intensity 4.47*** 2.84*** 3.81*** 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.29) 
R&D Intensity^2 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
East -2.83 -9.39*** 2.05 
 (2.08) (1.86) (2.04) 
Intercept -46.27*** -35.78*** -60.21*** 
  (8.84) (7.63) (8.24) 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (11) 66.42*** 30.46*** 66.60*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (14) 131.33*** 53.23***  145.60*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Founding Cohorts, χ2 (3) 7.78** 7.93** 6.42* 
Log-Likelihood -17424.92 -10940.70 -15541.93 
Observations 5986 5986 5986 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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FIGURE 
Figure 1: Predicted Values of Radical Innovations for CVs and IVs 
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